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Is ASIO’s Corporate Governance an Oxymoron?

Mark Rix
Faculty of Business, University of Wollongong 1

Abstract
This paper investigates corporate governance in the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation (ASIO), Australia’s domestic intelligence agency. The paper seeks to determine
and understand the extent to which ASIO’s approach to corporate governance emulates that
of organisations in the wider public sector and the private sector. This examination of ASIO’s
corporate governance considers the organisation’s purpose, functions and extraordinary
powers focusing on the importance of secrecy to achieving its objectives. The paper will also
assess whether it is appropriate to attempt to assess ASIO’s corporate governance in the same
terms, and according to like standards, as are used to evaluate governance in ‘normal’ or
‘regular’ public and private sector organisations. Finally, the paper provides an overall
evaluation of ASIO’s approach to corporate governance and considers how this approach
affects the organisation’s treatment of its stakeholders and the extent to which it serves their
interests. 2

Introduction
This paper investigates the question of whether corporate governance principles and practices
that apply to most organisations in the private and public (and, not-for-profit) sectors are also
applicable to intelligence agencies like the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
(ASIO). ASIO is Australia’s domestic intelligence agency. Of course, ASIO is a part of the
broader Commonwealth public sector but its functions and extraordinary powers set it well
apart from agencies, departments and the like belonging to the ‘regular’ public sector. 3 These
distinguishing functions and powers have a distinct tendency to make questions about the
corporate governance of ASIO seem futile and on the face of it even a little absurd. Like most
other aspects of ASIO, its corporate governance is a closely-guarded secret with any
information and documentation that could be useful or revealing accordingly receiving a very
high level of classification. The little information regarding its corporate governance that is
available in the public domain is essentially part of an exercise in glib public relations
including modish references to ‘outreach’ and ‘stakeholder satisfaction’, and trite corporate
branding of the ‘our work’, ‘our values’ and ‘our performance’ kind. 4 In any event, ASIO’s
1
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extraordinary powers and the extraordinary secrecy surrounding the organisation give
questions about its governance, and performance in protecting Australia’s national security, a
great significance with an urgent need for convincing answers. Naturally, this does not entail
that these questions will be at all easy to answer. But, it does mean that it is nevertheless
important to ask them and seek whatever answers are able to be uncovered.

It is pretty obvious that reaching any understanding of ASIO governance requires some
knowledge of the organisation’s purpose and powers and the importance of secrecy in the
performance of its mission and exercise of its powers. Left open is the question of how in any
case its performance in protecting national security is to be evaluated when its operations are
shrouded in secrecy and underwritten by legislation that protects this secrecy. The legislation
imposes harsh penalties for, amongst other things, unauthorised disclosure of information
regarding ASIO’s operations, the identity of ASIO employees or ‘affiliates’, and the
detention and questioning of suspects and non-suspects while they are held in detention and
for some time afterwards. This raises a potentially intractable obstacle for an investigation of
ASIO corporate governance: secrecy could well be a necessary, if not altogether sufficient,
condition of ASIO undertaking its mission to protect Australia’s national security. It is a
moot point whether secrecy makes it impossible to know whether this is or is not the case.
However, assuming for the moment secrecy is a necessary condition of ASIO performance
then it follows that if ASIO and its activities were not shrouded in a thick blanket of secrecy
then it couldn’t even begin to set about protecting Australia’s national security which is its
overriding purpose. It would fall at the first hurdle because on this score at least openness and
transparency would prevent it from undertaking almost any effective activities or operations
towards achieving this purpose and therefore completely undermine its performance. And, if
secrecy is necessary for ASIO’s successful performance in protecting national security, this
would effectively put a definitive stop to any attempt to evaluate its performance, and the
governance arrangements behind it, in a meaningful and informative way for to do so would
be utterly futile and ultimately fruitless. Paradoxically, of course, secrecy makes such a
conclusion an almost completely unfounded one. This is also the case with the opposite or
any other conclusions.

This paper is based on the premise that an effective, comprehensive approach to or system of
corporate governance is essential for high-performing, responsive and ethical organisations in
both the private and public sectors. Such a corporate governance approach or system would at
a minimum embody high standards of leadership and management including disclosure,
transparency and accountability, complementary principles underpinning and governing the
performance of staff and how they conduct their operations, and an overall culture of
integrity, decency, ethical conduct, responsibility, and accountability. In addition to these
values, principles and practices, effective corporate governance requires a genuine
commitment from an organisation and its leaders, managers and staff to openness and
honesty, transparency and disclosure. These should be the values at the core of an
organisation’s culture. Much more could of course be said about what else comprehensive
corporate governance entails, including sound risk management policies, an effective
whistleblower policy with assured whistleblower protections, a real commitment to corporate
social responsibility, and a sincere, respectful engagement with stakeholders and dedication
to serving their interests. But the point here has simply been to establish the underlying
principles, values and practices which together comprise robust and comprehensive corporate
2

governance for almost any organisation from either the private or the public sector. Armed
with these insights into what corporate governance is and should be, the paper investigates
corporate governance in ASIO seeking to determine and understand the extent to which its
approach or system emulates that of its counterparts in the private and public sector.

Examining early conceptions of corporate governance, the next section provides an overview
of the principles and practices that underpin corporate governance and argues that the
stakeholder model or theory is, despite its shortcomings and with insights drawn from
enlightened shareholder theory, one of the more useful amongst a range of alternative
theories for investigating and understanding corporate governance ASIO-style. The following
section investigates corporate governance in ASIO examining ASIO’s mission, functions and
powers with a focus on the importance of secrecy to the effective performance and successful
achievement of its mission to protect Australia’s national security. Included here is an
assessment of ASIO’s response to the Snowden disclosures. Then, an investigation of ASIO’s
oversight and accountability framework is undertaken evaluating how secrecy affects the
framework’s effectiveness. The concluding section provides an overall evaluation of ASIO’s
approach to corporate governance and considers how this approach affects the organisation’s
treatment of its stakeholders and how well it serves their interests. This is of considerable
interest and concern because ASIO’s most important stakeholders are the Australian people
including their security and the rights and freedoms it is claimed that they have and should be
able to enjoy. This assessment of ASIO’s governance will briefly consider whether secrecy
contributes to or detracts from its performance in protecting national security so that these
stakeholders are able to exercise and enjoy their freedoms and rights.

Corporate governance: principles and practices
The importance of the theory and practice, discipline or subject, of corporate governance is
captured in this enduring and influential definition:
Corporate Governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and
social goals and between individual and communal goals. The corporate governance
framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require
accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as
possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society. 5
Cadbury extends this definition by asserting that disclosure is the foundation of any system of
corporate governance because it is this which is the ‘basis of public confidence in the
corporate system’. In his view, corporate governance is also based on the principles of
transparency, accountability, fairness and responsibility which are all ‘universal in
application’. 6
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It is certainly clear that, for Cadbury, corporate governance is not simply about maximising
shareholder value but with maintaining a balance between often inconsistent economic and
social, individual and communal goals and with reconciling to the extent possible the
competing interests of different stakeholder groups. The corporate governance system should
not only promote the efficient use of resources but also hold corporations, their owners and
those who lead and direct them responsible and accountable for how well resources are
managed. Thus, sustainability and corporate social and environmental responsibility, and
ethical business practice are also consistent with, if not core components of, Cadbury’s
conception of corporate governance. It should be equally clear that his conception is highly
applicable to corporate governance in the public and not-for-profit sectors where key
stakeholders whether they are called voters, taxpayers, citizens or members take the place of
and in many respects have similar rights and responsibilities to the shareholders of publiclylisted companies.

Writing at about the same time as Cadbury Brian Cheffins, SJ Berwin Professor of Corporate
Law at Cambridge University, observed that the discipline or subject of corporate governance
‘draws from a variety of fields other than law, including economics, ethics, accounting and
finance’ and that understanding the issues involves therefore requires students (and
practitioners) to acquire ‘some familiarity with the concepts, assumptions and vocabulary of
these various disciplines.’ 7 Studying, and indeed practising, corporate governance should
accordingly be based on an awareness and understanding of the economic, political, social
and cultural context within which publicly-listed companies and other organisations operate.
And, in an early account of the continuing debate about whether shareholder value or
stakeholder interests should take precedence in corporate governance regimes, Cheffins also
noted that ‘whereas some prefer to confine discussion by focusing on ways to improve the
return shareholders receive, others treat all corporate stakeholders, including employees,
suppliers, customers and even society at large, as being part of the corporate governance
equation.’ 8 While it is obvious that Cheffins was especially concerned with the governance of
publicly-listed companies his conception of corporate governance is, like Cadbury’s, readily
applicable to the corporate governance of public sector organisations and non-profits.

It is clear from the comments of Cadbury and Cheffins that what has become variously known
as the stakeholder model, theory or philosophy of corporate governance has had a long and
significant influence on the development of the subject or discipline of governance and on
governance practice. As suggested above, this enduring influence has helped to ensure that
corporate social and environmental responsibility and ethical business practice evolved as key
principles and aspects of both governance theory and practice. Advocates of stakeholder
theory contend as Cheffins suggested that directors and the corporations they oversee are
responsible and accountable to a range of stakeholders other than shareholders, the many
groups and individuals affected by their decisions, behaviour and operations. Responsibility
and accountability are or should be ‘the price society demands for the privilege of

7
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incorporation, granting shareholders limited liability for the company’s debts.’ 9 One of the
main difficulties encountered by advocates of stakeholder theory is in deciding how to
balance the often competing interests of different stakeholder groups when it is almost always
impossible to maximise or at least adequately satisfy all stakeholder interests at the same
time. 10 A key question emerges from this difficulty focusing on director and management
accountability: in seeking to serve the interests of different stakeholders, whose interests
should be given priority and how can directors and managers he held accountable for
favouring certain stakeholder interests over others? This also leaves unanswered a similarly
awkward question about how director and management performance should be evaluated and
rewarded. As Bob Tricker suggests, enlightened shareholder theory (or, enlightened
shareholder value)—a sort of hybrid of stewardship theory and stakeholder theory—can go
some of the way in resolving these dilemmas. The theory acknowledges that over the longer
term shareholder value can be increased or sustained only by satisfying the interests of key
stakeholders. 11 The practical application of enlightened shareholder theory is not without its
own difficulties and challenges but it is beyond the remit of this paper to explore these any
further.

Despite its evident shortcomings, stakeholder theory continues to be influential in the
development of corporate governance theory and practice. This influence is a product of its
insistence that corporate directors have important responsibilities and accountabilities beyond
simply serving the interests of shareholders by creating and increasing long-term profitability
and wealth. The notion of corporate social (and, environmental) responsibility and the kindred
‘ethical business practice’ have both grown out of this recognition. In taking their broader
responsibilities and accountabilities seriously, and modifying their behaviour and operations
in accordance with these, directors and corporations can be granted what is widely referred to
as a ‘social licence to operate’. For John Morrison, Executive Director of the Institute of
Human Rights and Business, the ‘social licence’ concept is even more important and useful
than that of ‘corporate social responsibility’ which can be perfunctory, self-serving and little
more than an exercise in reputation management and brand enhancement. Because business
can never award itself a ‘social licence’, being given such a licence by affected communities
and constituencies requires that business activities and operations enjoy ‘sufficient trust and
legitimacy, and [have] the consent of those affected.’ In managing social, environmental,
political and legal risks, businesses can’t by themselves decide how much prevention,
deterrence or mitigation is sufficient. Stakeholders and other rights-holders should be
involved in setting ‘thresholds of due diligence’ (in other words, audit, oversight and
accountability mechanisms) even if these have already been determined in relevant
legislation. Otherwise, such thresholds or standards can lack the legitimacy required for social
permission to be granted making it difficult for business to proceed with planned operations
and activities. 12 Clearly then, companies cannot exert anything like complete control over
‘social licence’ but they can nevertheless manage ‘issues such as transparency, accountability,
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clarity about benefits, remedies and adequate due diligence’. 13 Again, these are the conditions
that have to be satisfied before social consent or permission is granted in the first place.

As Cadbury asserted long ago, disclosure is a founding principle of corporate governance
because this is the basis of public confidence in business and, he might have added, in
government as well. Disclosure is closely aligned with, and is complementary to, the
principles of transparency, accountability, fairness and responsibility. Thus, these ancillary
principles too not only apply to the governance of corporations and the ‘corporate system’
more generally, they are just as applicable to the governance of government and of the public
sector including the various departments, agencies and authorities comprising it. This leaves a
very large question over the meaning of governance for an agency like ASIO for which
disclosure is in many respects an anathema. But, if secrecy is essential to ASIO’s performance
in protecting the security of the country and its people then it arguably would make little
sense to judge its governance, even if this were possible, by the same standards of disclosure,
transparency and the like as are used in judging corporations’ and ‘regular’ public sector
agencies’ governance. Accordingly, in the following sections ASIO corporate governance will
be investigated beginning with an examination of its mission, values and functions, and
powers with a view to determining how important secrecy is to the performance of its
mission. It will also consider the critical assessment of Edward Snowden’s disclosures
included in the ASIO Report to Parliament 2013-2014 and in recent speeches and addresses
by ASIO officials. This is important because ASIO’s critique of Snowden clearly reveals its
attitude to secrecy and disclosure which has significant implications for how well it serves the
interests of its key stakeholders. An examination of ASIO’s oversight and accountability
framework is then undertaken assessing how secrecy affects the framework’s effectiveness.
Finally, an overall evaluation is provided of ASIO’s performance in serving the interests of its
stakeholders, in particular, the Australian public.

ASIO corporate governance: security and secrecy
First, it is important to understand the meaning of security that it is ASIO’s role to protect.
This is contained in Section 4 of the ASIO Act 1979 where security is defined as meaning the
protection of Australia and Australians from espionage, sabotage, politically motivated
violence and the promotion of communal violence, attacks on the country’s ‘defence system,
foreign interference, whether these are ‘directed from, or committed within, Australia or not’
and, serious threats to the integrity of Australia’s borders and territory. This is broadened
considerably by the inclusion in the definition of security of ‘the carrying out of Australia’s
responsibilities to any foreign country’ in relation to any of these matters. 14 This expansive
view of security and ASIO’s role in protecting it is important background for understanding
the organisation’s vision, mission, objectives and so on.

The ASIO Strategic Plan 2013-16 provides a brief and relatively accessible introduction to
ASIO’s vision and mission, objectives and values (there is not the scope here to consider
13
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ASIO’s goals which in any event support its mission 15). ASIO’s vision, ‘The Intelligence
Edge for a Secure Australia’, is so vacuous as to warrant no further attention. Its mission is
‘To identify and investigate threats to security and provide advice to protect Australia, its
people and its interests’. In other words, ASIO’s mission is the protection of Australia’s
national security by collecting and assessing security intelligence and providing appropriate
advice to government. ASIO’s values are unexceptionable if not also a little vacuous:
Excellence, producing useful and timely advice, showing solid leadership and being
professional, being innovative and improving through learning; Integrity, being ethical and
unbiased, maintaining confidentiality and secrecy, respecting diversity; Accountability, being
responsible in conducting operations and for outcomes, and being accountable to the
Australian public through the government and parliament; Cooperation, developing a
common purpose and mutual support; using appropriate communications in all relationships;
having productive partnerships. 16 More important than ASIO’s vision, mission and values for
an understanding of ASIO’s governance arrangements are its objectives.

Under the ‘Our Work’ heading, the Strategic Plan makes it relatively clear, and not
surprisingly, that ASIO’s objectives complement and support the Government’s national
security strategy. There are four broad objectives of the strategy: ensuring the safety and
resilience of the population as a whole; protecting and strengthening Australia’s sovereignty
including independence of its decision making and authority over its territory and resources;
securing Australia’s assets, infrastructure and institutions, e.g. supply chains, intellectual
property, information technologies and communications networks, natural wealth; and,
promoting a favourable international environment through influencing and shaping the
country’s regional and global environment so that it is conducive to Australia’s interests and
values. 17

ASIO’s objectives (and goals) are largely reflected in the Outcomes and Deliverables that are
outlined in Part 2 Program Performance of the Annual Report 2013-2014. Part 2 is based on
publicly-available information. There is one outcome, Outcome 1, which is ‘To protect
Australia, its people and its interests from threats to security through intelligence collection,
assessment and advice to government.’ The Annual Report lists four program deliverables: 1.
security intelligence analysis and advice such as strategic and counter-espionage threat
assessment and advice, border security, engaging with and advising industry groups,
supporting prosecutions and litigation involving security intelligence; 2. protective security
advice which includes counter-terrorism checking, personnel and physical security, and
contributions to policy development; 3. security intelligence investigations and capabilities
which involves maintaining and enhancing collection of ‘all-source’ security intelligence,
analysis of complex tactical and technical data, technical R&D; counter-terrorism response,
liaising with national and international partners and stakeholders, and policy development; 4
collecting foreign intelligence in Australia when requested by the Ministers of Foreign
15

ASIO Strategic Plan 2013-16, above, n 4, at 3.
ASIO Strategic Plan 2013-16, above n 4, at 4. Some of the Strategic Plan’s text regarding ASIO’s values has
been paraphrased and slightly abridged. Oddly, the Strategic Plan does not include ‘Respect, We show respect in
our dealings with others’, as one of ASIO’s values unlike the Report to Parliament 2013-2014 which does so.
This could have been the result of a formatting issue and, after all, they’re only words.
17
ASIO, Strategic Plan 2013-16, above n 4, at 4. The objectives, deliverables and KPIs have all been
paraphrased and slightly abbreviated.
16
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Affairs and Defence or ‘incidentally’ as a result of existing security intelligence capabilities
or liaising with foreign partners. 18 Part 2 of the Annual Report also contains a self-assessment
of ASIO’s performance against its two key performance indicators and in terms of each
deliverable. The first of the KPIs deals with how in the reporting period ASIO’s action and
advice contributed to the management and reduction of risk to people and property, public,
private and national infrastructure and any special events of national or international
significance during the reporting period. The second deals with the security of ASIO’S
activities. Clearly, then, ASIO performance against the second of its KPIs depends heavily on
secrecy and the protection of secrecy. The importance of secrecy for ASIO performance
against Outcome 1, and the two KPIs and each of the deliverables, is demonstrated in the
Annual Report Part 3 Outcomes and highlights. This is ‘a detailed report of ASIO
performance and operations’ against Outcome 1. Unfortunately for transparency and
disclosure, and public confidence, ‘This part contains a national security classification of Top
Secret and is excised by the Attorney-General in its entirety…as unauthorised disclosure
could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the security of the
Australian Government.’ 19 At the beginning of Part 3 it is made clear that excising Part 3
(Exclusion) was done after the Attorney-General obtained advice from the Director-General
of Security that it ‘is necessary in order to avoid prejudice to security.’ 20 No mention is made
here of ‘exceptionally grave damage’.

The Report’s revealing critique of Snowden’s revelations is contained in Part 1 The Security
Environment and Outlook under the unsettling heading Espionage and clandestine foreign
interference. It begins: ‘Self-motivated individuals who exploit their privileged access to
government information to make unauthorised disclosures of classified or other privileged
information have always been a potential source of harm to Australia’s interests.’ 21 The harm
that such individuals can cause has been, according to the Report, ‘greatly increased by
modern information technology, which allows large amounts of information to be aggregated
and copied’ and further ‘amplified’ by the internet with its capacity for easy distribution of
the information to a large audience that is ready to ‘consume’ it. Overlooked here, and
cynically inverted, was what the Snowden disclosures actually revealed: the significant harm
to human rights and democratic freedoms increased by modern information technology
allowing the bulk collection and aggregation (storage and retention) of large amounts of
information that has been amplified by the internet making it even easier for agencies like the
US NSA, UK GCHQ and Australian ASD to collect, aggregate and cross-reference vast
amounts of information about the private communications (metadata and content) of innocent
individuals. In any event, for ASIO Snowden was a ‘malicious insider’ who caused ‘widescale and indiscriminate’ harm that will be ‘felt for many years’ to come because his actions
have the ‘very real potential’ to ‘inspire and influence people who wrongly regard him as a
whistleblower’. 22 In substantiating its claim that it is incorrect to regard Edward Snowden as
a real whistleblower, the Report quotes at length from Attorney-General George Brandis’
speech to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC delivered in
April 2014. In this speech, Brandis cited The Snowden Operation by Edward Lucas (Lucas is
The Economist’s Senior Editor), who in turn had cited Princeton University academic Rahul
18
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Sagur’s Secrets and Leaks. Based on these sources, Brandis was able to assert that there are
three principal criteria that have to be satisfied for a person to qualify as a whistleblower: the
person must have unambiguous and compelling evidence of abuse, misconduct or corruption;
disclosing the information must not disproportionately threaten public safety; and, to the
extent possible, the scope and scale of the information ‘leaked’ must be limited. According to
Brandis citing Lucas, Snowden failed the whistleblower test on all three counts. 23

The Snowden exposures, disclosures or ‘leaks” have ensured that the issue of what is, and
what is not, whistleblowing and who should be, and who should not be, regarded as a
whistleblower, is now a thorny and vexed one for ASIO. Snowden’s actions have also
reinforced for ASIO the need for greater secrecy and the strict protection of secrecy. In his
Review which precedes the ASIO Report proper, then Director-General of Security David
Irvine acknowledges that effective disclosure (whistleblowing) laws ensure that (undefined)
‘improper conduct’ within government including its intelligence agencies ‘is investigated and
dealt with’. Thus, ASIO, and its Director-General, welcomed the enactment of the Public
Interest Disclosure Act 2013 which commenced in 2014. However, it did so not because this
Act provides for adequate protections for genuine whistleblowers who expose misconduct,
abuse of powers or corruption but because the Act contains measures for the ‘appropriate
protection against the unauthorised disclosure of intelligence information’ by people like
Snowden who are ‘self-motivated malicious insiders‘ frequently acting out of a personal
grievance or misguided agenda. 24 In other words, Irvine and ASIO welcomed the
introduction of the Public Interest Disclosure Act precisely because the Act protects the
secrecy of the organisation, its operatives and its operations from unwanted exposure by even
genuine whistleblowers and journalists who act in the public interest. In any event,
investigating the actions of people like Snowden is ‘complex, resource-intensive and highly
sensitive’ requiring ASIO and similar organisations to be ‘appropriate and proportionate’ in
their response balancing ‘individual privacy considerations’ against the potential harm these
individuals can inflict by their actions. 25

Some of the same themes were taken up by one of the two (anonymous) Deputy DirectorsGeneral of Security who addressed the Security in Government Conference in September
2014. 26 In keeping with the Conference theme, the Deputy Director General’s address was
titled ‘The espionage threat from trusted insiders’. 27 According to the Deputy Director-

23
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General, it is not only malicious insiders recruited by foreign intelligence services who pose a
significant risk to national security and potentially cause ‘catastrophic harm’ to Australia and
its interests. Just as harmful are ‘self-motivated malicious insiders’ motivated by
‘disgruntlement, revenge, ego, a sense of the misguided greater good or loyalties, or financial
gain’ who ‘betray the trust of their employer’. Like his boss David Irvine, the Deputy
Director-General had Edward Snowden squarely in his sights. She/he quoted the AttorneyGeneral to reject the claim that Snowden is a whistleblower but also to label him a ‘traitor’:
‘He is a traitor because, by a cold-blooded and calculated act, he attacked your country [the
US] by significantly damaging its capacity to defend itself from its enemies, and in doing so,
he put your citizen’s [sic] lives at risk. And, in the course of doing so, he also compromised
the national security of America’s closest allies, including Australia’s.’ 28
In the end, according to the Deputy Director-General, the Government and public servants
have a ‘fundamental duty’ to uphold and defend the country’s interests including ‘holding
secrets’ and to protect such confidential (that is, classified) information ‘in many instances
for life’. 29 His then boss, David Irvine, had had a similar message when in August 2014 he
addressed the National Press Club (an extremely rare event for a Director-General) and
delivered a speech titled ‘Diligence in the shadows—ASIO’S responsibility’. Spruiking
ASIO’s role and work, Irvine pointed out that the former is identifying and assessing threats
to national security and to the lives and safety of Australians while the latter, which is
‘predictive and advisory’, is essentially an exercise in risk management which enables the
Government to take preventative measures. As well as being different from the law
enforcement work of police services, another ‘defining characteristic’ of ASIO’s work is the
‘need for a security intelligence service to operate in secrecy.’ 30 In explaining why secrecy is
necessary, and in another cynical allusion, Irvine noted that ‘As any journalist will
understand, we need to protect our sources’ (community contacts or covert human sources)
from being put in ‘real personal danger’. 31 In addition, not only did secrecy protect ASIO’s
‘operational techniques’ from becoming known to ‘our adversaries’ who if they had this
knowledge would be better placed to disguise their ‘malicious activities’, it also protected
from exposure any intelligence provided by ‘our friends and allies’. Irvine’s final apologia for
secrecy is that bizarrely it is ‘to the benefit of individuals whom ASIO may be investigating’
because ‘[t]he reputations, livelihoods and future prospects of such people, many of whom
may turn out not to be of security concern after all, may be damaged if our work is not
conducted discreetly, out of the public gaze.’ 32
The all-encompassing definition of security contained in the ASIO Act is matched by the allencompassing secrecy surrounding ASIO, its operatives and operations. The ASIO Act, the
National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 and, ironically, the
Statements/Speeches-and-Statements/DDG-Speech-02-September-2014.html>. It is a moot point whether the
Deputy Director-General’s speech was in fact ASIO’s ‘separate briefing’ to the conference.
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Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 all work in concert having ‘the effect of creating a sort of
three-sided hall of mirrors in which each Act’s restrictions on the disclosure, and availability,
of information are tightened as one Act reinforces the others in providing fewer and narrower
avenues for access to and release of information in the conduct of terrorism investigations
and any subsequent trials.’ 33 The Acts’ severe restrictions on disclosure of and access to
information about ASIO and its activities have been further tightened and reinforced by
provisions contained in the National Security Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2014. This
Act creates an offence with a prison sentence of up to five years and an aggravated offence
(where a discloser intentionally or recklessly endangers the health and safety of a person or
adversely affects the conduct of an SIO) with a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment
for the unauthorised disclosure of information about ASIO special intelligence operations
(SIOs). An SIO is defined as an ASIO operation that is relevant to its performing a ‘special
intelligence function’ which includes collection and analysis of intelligence related to
security. No allowance is made for public interest disclosures and whistleblowing by ASIO
employees or of disclosures by journalists. The offences therefore seriously encroach on free
speech and expression and on media freedom. 34 In addition to these restrictions, the National
Security Legislation Amendment Act enhances ASIO’s surveillance powers by strengthening
its powers to collect and retain metadata. 35 These enhancements are complemented by the
additional powers handed to ASIO in the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment
(Foreign Fighters) Act 2014 which enables ASIO to collect and retain metadata and to obtain
access to computers even when these have nothing to do with the protection of national
security.

ASIO corporate governance: oversight and accountability?
According to the Strategic Plan 2013-16, ‘Our [ASIO’s] corporate governance arrangements
support the management and evaluation of performance across a range of ASIO’s
functions.’ 36 The Strategic Plan itself is an important component of these governance
arrangements reflecting ASIO’s responsibility not only for meeting Australia’s current
security needs but also for ‘ensuring that Australia’s national security capability is
maintained’ to enable it to meet the country’s future security challenges. 37 The Plan
underpins ASIO’s strategic and operational planning and sets the organisation’s overall
direction in business plans, the priorities of its corporate committees, and ‘executive focus’. It
also ensures that ASIO’s investments in capability development are aligned with the goals in
the Strategic Plan and that its performance is measured and reported in accordance with the
Plan. The Strategic Plan also briefly outlines ASIO’s oversight and accountability
framework. This framework is explained in a little more detail in the Director-General’s
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speech to the National Press Club and more detail is provided in the Report to Parliament and
other ASIO documents.

In his speech, the Director-General pointed out that
ASIO is accountable directly to the Parliament. The Organisation provides an annual
report to the Parliament of its activities, has its activities scrutinised at Senate Estimates
[Committee], it briefs the Opposition, appears before the bipartisan Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Intelligence and Security, and provides as required public and private
briefings to various Senate committees. It is audited by the ANAO [Australian National
Audit Office]. 38
In addition to these arrangements, ASIO’s oversight and accountability framework contains a
number of other important components. ASIO reports yearly to the National Security
Committee of the Cabinet and submits a classified annual report to Parliament. The AttorneyGeneral has oversight of all ASIO operations and issues each warrant for the use of ASIO’s
‘intrusive powers.’ The ASIO Act requires the organisation to comply with the AttorneyGeneral’s Guidelines for performing its functions of collecting, correlating, analysing and
communicating intelligence related to security and in relation to politically motivated
violence. 39 ASIO’s security assessments can be reviewed by the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal, the Independent Reviewer of Adverse Security Assessments and the courts. The
Independent National Security Legislation Monitor reviews the legislative framework within
which ASIO carries out its counter-terrorism work and can recommend changes to
legislation. The legality, propriety and proportionality of ASIO’s work are subject to
independent oversight by the Inspector-General of Security and Intelligence, the peak
oversight and accountability for Australia’s various intelligence services. The role of the IGIS
is to ensure that the intelligence services, including ASIO, act legally and with propriety and
in accordance with ministerial guidelines and directives, and with respect for human rights.
The IGIS has wide-ranging powers including those of a Royal Commission. Among the
IGIS’s specific powers are conducting inquiries into the activities of the intelligence agencies
from the IGIS’s own motion or in response to a reference or complaint from the responsible
Minister, requiring witnesses to attend inquiries conducted by the Inspector-General, and
taking sworn evidence and copying and retaining documents. Inspector-General staff are also
able to enter security agency premises when conducting an inquiry and act on complaints
from ASIO and ASIS employees about certain matters relating to the conditions of their
employment. 40

The Director-General regards this oversight and accountability framework as ‘robust and
effective’. However, his view is not a universally shared one. In mid-October 2014, for
38
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example, the Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security began recruitment
of five more staff to add to the existing 12 in order to enable the office to monitor ASIO’s
exercise of the enhanced powers it was granted by the two amendment bills that were
considered above. 41 A number of commentators were concerned about the extent to which
five additional staff would actually strengthen the Office’s capabilities to provide thorough
oversight of ASIO, as well as of the other intelligence agencies such as the Australian Secret
Intelligence Service (ASIS, Australia’s overseas secret intelligence collection agency).
Professor George Williams of the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law at UNSW pointed
out that ‘it has been regarded for some time that IGIS is underfunded and has not kept up
with the enormous increase of personnel within the intelligence community and the
significant expansion of their powers.’ Matthew Rimmer, of the ANU College of Law, agreed
with Williams calling the IGIS ‘a bit of a paper tiger’ that provides only ‘weak oversight’. 42
Independent Senator Nick Xenophon also expressed criticism of the Inspector-General.
Commenting on the Inspector-General’s inquiry into a case involving an Australian soldier
who allegedly pulled a gun on an ASIS agent, Senator Xenophon noted that she seemed to
have a ‘very cosy and collegial relationship’ with ASIS and the other intelligence agencies
‘which is not appropriate’. He also believed that in investigating the incident, the InspectorGeneral had been ‘either misled or lied to’. 43 Under the existing legislative framework, lying
to the Inspector-General by an intelligence service carries no penalty.

Conclusion: Public confidence and social licence by default?
In spite of the Director-General’s assurances, ASIO lacks a comprehensive and robust
oversight and accountability framework. The oversight bodies are hamstrung by legislation
protecting the secrecy shrouding the organisation and its operations including by imposing
limits on the powers of the oversight bodies themselves. And, because when it is claimed that
national security is at stake the oversight bodies seem reluctant to exercise to the extent
possible the limited powers that they already have. The relevant legislation, including the
misnamed Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013, also severely penalises genuine
whistleblowers and journalists from making disclosures about ASIO and its operations even
if these disclosures are in the public interest. These tight restrictions on the availability of and
access to information about ASIO have been reinforced and further tightened in the National
Security Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2014. If as Cadbury asserted, disclosure is the
foundation of corporate governance because without disclosure the public cannot have
confidence organisations are being run effectively and in the interests of genuine stakeholders
then there are few grounds for the Australian public to have much confidence that ASIO is
serving their interests or for giving it a carte blanche social licence. On this score at least,
ASIO’s corporate governance is an oxymoron. In the end, however, this dilemma is an
unresolvable one for it cannot be concluded with any certainty that national security is only
able to be protected with tight secrecy. Tight secrecy, and a lack of transparency and
accountability accompanying it, comes with considerable risk of misuse and abuse of power
and limits on the Australian people’s ability to enjoy their fundamental rights and freedoms.
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